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The opposition is indispensable. A good statesman, like any other sensible human 
being, always learns more from his opponents than from his fervent supporters. 
WALTER LIPPMANN, "The Indispensable Opposition" (1939) 
Every hero must have his antagonist, and for John Dewey, theorist of demo-
cratic communication, that role has long been played by Walter Lippmann of the 
Lippmann-Dewey debate. Pessimistic, where Dewey was optimistic; concerned to 
remove decision-making from a feeble public to a technocratic elite, where 
would solve the problems of democracy with more democracy; invested in value-
free scientific rationality, where Dewey embraced reasoning joined with aesthetic, 
emotional, and ethical responsiveness; interested in communication mostly as a tool 
for manufacturing consent, where Dewey understood it as the conversational proc 
cess through which citizens could mutually form each other: this Lippmann's errors 
provide the dark background against which Dewey's virtues shine. 
But recent scholarship--as scholarship will-has revised this received 
(Crick; Jansen, "Straw Man"; Jansen, "Phantom Conflict"; Russill; Schudson). The 
familiar Lippmann created to be Dewey's foil appears to be a phantom. 
never advocated propaganda as a tool for domestic politics," Nathan Crick states. 
bluntly (489). Nor did the actual Lippmann depart from the pragmatist's commit-
ment to uniting reason and interest, nor did he defend technocratic rule, and his 
pessimism at the end became so thoroughgoing that (as we shall see) it turned into 
sort of hope. Both men were trying to reconstruct democratic practices to meet 
exigencies of a new age. Their exchange resembled more a call and response than a 
debate. In the years after the Great War, Lippmann wrote a series of books, trying to 
absorb the lessons it had taught on the impotence of journalists, citizens, officials, 
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d even experts to think their way out of its "brutality and hysteria" (Lippmann, 
:blic Opinion 262). Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom Public (1925) were the 
final two works in the series, laying out Lippmann's most comprehensive views. 
Dewey responded to both in laudatory reviews in the New Republic ("Public Opin-
ion" and "Practical Democracy:' respectively) and was spurred to extend his remarks 
in lectures delivered in 1926 at Kenyon College, published the following year as The 
Public and Its Problems. In one of that book's few explicit mentions of others' works, 
Dewey acknowledges "his indebtedness" to Lippmann "for ideas involved in my 
entire discussion even when it reaches conclusions diverging from his" (n6-17m). 
In public at least, Lippmann did not respond. 
"There is something of a tragic irony to the narrative often used to recount the 
Dewey/ Lippmann debate:' Crick comments. "In their original works, each thinker 
attempted to move beyond the binary ?ppositions that polarize compleX: issues and 
paralyze public discussion" (Crick 483). Sue Curry Jansen notes the same distor-
tions and remarks that "clearly there is something about the exchange that resonates 
closely with our own collective anxieties about the viability of participatory democ-
racy" ("Phantom Conflict" 222). We will learn more, however, if we refrain from 
projecting onto Dewey and Lippmann our need for drama. 
In this essay I propose putting aside the phantom Lippmann in order to recover 
two aspects of the real Lippmann's thinking that help throw light on Dewey's. First, 
I examine Lippmann's critique of contemporary democratic practice, in which 
Dewey joined; second, I consider Lippmann's proposed communicative solution, 
from which Dewey departed. By examining their shared problematic and their com-
mon conceptions, we can construct a more nuanced reading of their works, one 
which throws into relief their diverging views on the roles communication can play 
in democratic life. Dewey's influence on communication theory and pedagogy may 
be familiar; Lippmann's less well-known alternative, as it turns out, is equally demo-
cratic and allows us to renew our appreciation of vital but not always valued aspects 
of the traditions of communication theory and pedagogy. In the end we will see that 
Lippmann indeed provided Dewey his indispensable opposition. 
LIPPMANN, DEWEY'S ALLY ON THE CHALLENGES 
FACING CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY 
We can start from the common ground: Dewey's diagnosis of the problem of democ-
racy, drawn from Lippmann, who had built in turn on the work of the early social 
psychologist Graham Wallas. Wallas was a Fabian socialist, an education reformer, 
and a faculty member at the inaugurations of both the London School of Econom-
ics and the New School for Social Research. On a visiting appointment at Harvard, 
he had formed a close relationship with the undergraduate Lippmann, joining an 
oddly assorted fan club that also included William James and George Santayana. 
In his 1914 book dedicated to Lippmann, Wallas coined the phrase "the Great Soci-
ety" to capture his sense of the emerging crisis (Weiner). Contemporary society was 
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"Great" not as the superlative of "good" (as with Lyndon Baines Johnson's social 
program) but as the superlative of"big." Changes in communication, transporta-
tion, and energy technologies over the previous century had dramatically increased 
the scale of social relations, creating "an environment which, both in its world-wide 
extension and its intimate connection with all sides of human existence, is without 
precedent in the history of the world" (Wallas, Great Society 1). "A sudden decision 
by some financier whose name he has never heard," Wallas continued, "may, at any 
moment, close the office or mine or factory in which [the worker] is employed .... 
The widow who takes in washing fails or succeeds according to her skill in choosing 
starch or soda or a wringing-machine under the influence of half-a-dozen compet~ 
ing world-schemes of advertisement" (Great Society 4). But the scale and complexity 
of society had not been matched by any new growth in human endowments. So 
Wallas found himself "sometimes doubting, not only as to the future happiness of 
individuals in the Great Society, but as to the permanence of the Great Society itself. 
Why should we expect a social organisation to endure, which has been formed in a 
moment of time by human beings, whose bodies and minds are the result of age-
long selection under far different conditions" (Great Society 8). 
Lippmann and, after him, Dewey shared these doubts. Modes of democratic 
political organization originally imagined as suited for "remote, unspoiled country 
villages" (Lippmann, Public Opinion169) were inadequate to deal with the problems 
that arose as "local communities without intent or forecast found their affairs condi-
tioned by remote and invisible organizations" (Dewey, Public and Problems 98). The 
media, even where not corrupted by censorship and propaganda, were subject to 
inevitable "distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very small 
messages" (Lippmann, Public Opinion 18) and because journalists were themselves 
unable to determine the "meaning" of events, to place "the new ... in relation to the 
old" (Dewey, Public and Problems 180 ). In addition individual citizens encountering 
a now-enlarged world found themselves adrift, at the mercy of "unseen environ-
ment" (Lippmann, Public Opinion 40), "hapless subjects of overwhelming opera-
tions with which they were hardly acquainted and over which they had no more 
control than over the vicissitudes of climate" (Dewey, Public and Problems 130). The 
Great War had demonstrated as much. 
It is this last problem that most occupied both Lippmann and Dewey. Human 
cognitive capacities evolved to manage social interactions in small communities 
were not sufficient to enable the citizen to judge, or even understand, or even per-
ceive a society grown "Great:' "The world that we have to deal with politically is out 
of reach, out of sight, out of mind:' Lippmann explains (Public Opinion18); "mod-
ern society is not visible to anybody, nor intelligible continuously and as a whole" 
(Lippmann, Phantom Public 32). But while "the environment is complex, man's 
political capacity is simple" 1 (Phalltom Public 68); "we are not equipped to deal 
with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations" 
(Lippmann, Public Opinionn). The citizen "cannot know all about everything all the 
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time, and while he is watching one thing a thousand others undergo great changes" 
(Public Opinion 15). In an argument prescient of recent thinking about the "atten-
tion economy:' Lippmann asks, "how, while he is earning a living, rearing children 
and enjoying his life, [the citizen] is to keep himself informed about the progress 
of this swarming confusion of problems" (Phantom Public 14). Citizens do not pos-
sess "an unlimited quantity of public spirit, interest, curios!ty and effort" (Phantom 
Public 14); their attention is limited, and thus their knowledge as well. So no citizen 
could hope to be "omnicompetent" in the way that would be necessary in order for 
him or her to have a sound opinion on all matters of public business. 
"Mr. Lippmann has thrown into clearer relief than any other writer the fun-
damental difficulty of democracy," Dewey wrote in his "Public Opinion" (288). As 
he explained in his own book, "the problem of a democratically organized public 
is primarily and essentially an intellectual problem" (Dewey, Public and Problems 
126). Referring repeatedly to the "Great Society," Dewey endorses Wallas's conclu-
sion that we have entered "a new age of human relations" (for example, Dewey, 
Public and Problems 96-98, 141). There is "too much of public concern for our exist-
ing resources to cope with:' he concludes (Public and Problems 126). "The local face-
to-face community has been invaded by forces so vast, so remote in initiation, so 
far-reaching in scope and so complexly indirect in operation, that they are, from 
the standpoint of the members oflocal social units, unknown" (Public and Problems 
131). But how are citizens supposed to make good decisions about "unknowns"? 
Both Lippmann and Dewey confessed the "intellectual" restrictions of most 
citizens-of most but not all. Both also recognized two more epistemically privi-
leged groups. The insiders to any particular affair were interested enough to invest 
their time in it, had taken opportunities to gain experience in it, and thus had the 
knowledge to form sound decisions concerning it. Of course the success of these 
insiders made more noticeable how everyone else-lacking interest, opportunities, 
and knowledge-remained outsiders to that affair, not positioned to understand it., 
Both Lippmann and Dewey also held fast to the progressive hope that contributions 
from experts of various kinds could improve the management of public affairs. In 
particular both looked to the new social sciences to take the Great Society itself as an ' 
object of inquiry. Such experts could cultivate methodically the comprehensive view 
of the vast and interconnected world that ordinary citizens were not positioned to 
develop. 
This diagnosis of the diseases of democracy still rings true. Consider some 
examples. What should be the U.S. policy toward Laos? How if it all should the rules 
of various sports be modified to reduce the number and severity of concussions? 
What should be the buffer zone separating genetically modified from unmodified 
crops-five yards, fifty yards, five hundred? Likely the limit should be different for 
different crops and possibly for different local environmental conditions, but how? 
I am confident that farmers, conventional and organic, have views on this subject 
worthy of respect. My colleagues over in the agronomy department can report their 
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scientific findings. It is an important public issue in many areas of the country. But 
it is not one on which even I would give much credit to my own "public opinion." 
I am sure I could learn enough about the subject if I wanted to--I was not born to 
outsider status. But I have other things to do. 
As one of Dewey's biographers has remarked, "Dewey accepted most of Lipp-
mann's complaints against the existing order of things" (Ryan 217). Jansen's retrac-
ing of the immediate reception of The Public and Its Problems has documented that 
contemporary readers took the book in the same way, "as an affirmation and ampli-
fication of Lippmann's diagnosis of the eclipse of the public" (Jansen, "Phantom 
Conflict" 226). For both men, the central problem facing democracy in the Great 
Society was epistemic: the inability of ordinary citizens to know the world in which 
they had to act. 
DEWEY ON DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNICATION 
It is at this point that Dewey and Lippmann finally begin to diverge. Before recon-
structing the nonphantom Lippmann's proposals for making democracy work in 
a Great Society, a brief exanlination of Dewey's proposals, expressed in a series of 
provocative, often-quoted-and maddeningly brief-passages in The Public and Its 
Problems, is in order. 
Dewey's insiders are those directly involved in some joint action (a "private 
transaction"); they are positioned to perceive some of the consequences of what 
they are doing and to take those consequences into account in making decisions. 
The actual consequences of many transactions spill over, however, to affect oth-
ers. These outsiders constitute the public. They share an interest in managing the 
broader "extensive and enduring indirect consequences" (Dewey, Public and Prob-
lems 47) oflocal transactions, although they do not have the means to perceive those 
consequences clearly as they ripple outward through the vast reaches of the Great 
Society. But the public's ignorance is not irremediable. Knowledge for Dewey is not 
an individual accomplishment but a social one; tluough participating in any of the 
forms of activity made available through the organization of society, each person 
gains the accumulated knowledge "embodied" in it As Dewey puts it, "many a man 
who has tinkered with radios can judge of things which Faraday did not dream of" 
(Public and Problems 210 ). For public affairs, this principle suggests that if the pub-
lic's activities were better organized, even outsiders could share in existing knowl-
edge and indeed begin to create new knowledge. 
Dewey hints at this solution in "Practical Democracy:' his review of The Phan-
tom Public, endorsing Lippmann's discussion "of the inherent problems and dan-
gers the Great Society has brought with it" but also calling for "further analysis" of 
the "organization of society itself" as providing "the only sure road out" ("Practi-
cal Democracy" 54). The Public and Its Problems provides that analysis. "The prime 
condition of a democratically organized public is a kind of knowledge and insight 
which does not yet exist:' Dewey says (Public and Problems 166). To bring it into 
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existence, the public's affairs need to be reconceptualized and eventually reinstitu-
tionalized as a vast "social inquiry" into the problems of the Great Society. Adopt-
ing a suitably pragmatist "experimental" method, policy proposals will "be treated 
as working hypotheses, ... subject to constant and well-equipped observation of 
the consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible 
revision in the light of observed consequences" (202-3). The inquiry must detect 
"the energies which are at work and trac[e] them through an intricate network of 
interactions to their consequences" (177). Experts can aid the public by "recording 
and interpreting (organizing)" (203) the results of the inquiry. The public, however, 
retains responsibility for coming to recognize its own interests in the course of fig-
uring out what to do. In Dewey's analogy, "the man who wears the shoe knows best 
that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge 
of how the trouble is to be remedied" (207). · 
"Popular government," Dewey concludes, "is educative as other modes of politi-
cal regulation are not" (Dewey, Public and Problems 207); it changes citizens, form-
ing them to be competent for public affairs. To make democracy as social inquiry. 
work, "the essential need ... is the improvement of the methods and conditions 
of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public" (Dewey, 
Public and Problems 208). The results of the social inquiry must be communicated 
among the public, so that citizens can share the knowledge being created, articulate 
their interests, and come to recognize themselves as a public. While the technologies 
to accomplish this already exist-"telegraph, telephone, and now the radio, cheap 
and quick mails, the print press, capable of swift reduplication of material at low 
cost" (Public and Problems 179)-the practices for using these media are in need of 
overhaul. In both his reviews of Lippmann's works Dewey calls for a journalism 
that will "sensationalize" social inquiry, making the "thrill" of seeing the "underlying 
forces moving in and through events" accessible through a "union of social science, 
access to facts, and the art of literary presentation" (Dewey, "Public Opinion" 288;, 
see also Dewey, "Practical Democracy" 54). In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey 
elaborates this call through a discussion of the need for artistry in communicating 
public affairs. "Artists have always been the real purveyors of news," he explains, "for 
it is not the outward happening in itself which is new, but the kindling by it of emo-
tion, perception and appreciation" (Dewey, Public and Problems 184). So the renewal 
of democracy awaits a new movement of artist-journalists who will take advantage 
of the powers the new media afford.2 Dewey sums up with the following prophetic 
announcement: "till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the 
Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create, a great community" 
(Dewey, Public and Problems 142). 
DEWEY's IMPACT ON COMMUNICATION PEDAGOGY AND THEORY 
Scholars and teachers of communication responded enthusiastically to Dewey's 
gestures of friendship for their subject. The immense impact of Dewey's political! 
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epistemological views on communication pedagogy has been documented by Wil-
liam Keith in his excellent Democracy as Discussion and is the focus of other contri-
butions to this volume. Equipping students to deliberate with each other has long 
been a central preoccupation of rhetoricians in the traditions of English and com-
munication courses (Jackson). The Dewey-inspired "discussion method," with its 
coconstruction of knowledge through collaborative, open, face-to-face communica-
tion, has leaped beyond the confines of the communication fields to become in the 
form of "group work" one of the mainstays of contemporary instruction. Dewey's 
pragmatism has also emerged as a main current in communication theory (Craig). 
Every approach stressing the cooperative nature of argumentation shows the direct 
or indirect effects of Dewey's ideas (for example, Walton). Dewey's greatest impact 
on theory, however, has been in provoking a tradition of work on public deliberation 
that preceded and in significant ways differed from the Habermas-inspired schol-
arship on the public sphere. In his classic essay "The Rhetorical Situation," Lloyd 
Bitzer filled in the oudines Dewey had sketched, establishing what rhetoric must be 
if it is to serve as the public's instrument for social inquiry in a pragmatist mode. 
In later works Bitzer, joined by his students Thomas Farrell and Gerard Hauser-
and eventually by their students-went on to examine further how rhetoric takes 
up and creates public knowledge (Bitzer, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge"; Farrell; 
Hauser). This tradition continues to place at the center of theoretical attention the 
communicative processes through which the public comes to know-know itself 
and its world. 
LIPPMANN, DEWEY'S ADVERSARY ON 
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATION 
Dewey's response to the episternic challenges of the Great Society may be familiar, 
as are some of these responses to his work by communication scholars and teach-
ers. Lippmann's response is less so, in part because of the distorting influence of the 
scholarly tradition that has needed him to be Dewey's antagonist (Schudson; Jansen, 
"Straw Man"; Jansen, "Phantom Conflict"; Crick) and in part because of his own 
changes of mind. As has been frequendy pointed out, Lippmann took full advantage 
of the columnist's privilege of having opinions four times a week. At one time or 
another he experimented with a democracy that institutionalized virtually every 
possible arrangement of the available roles. In the early Liberty and the News he 
foreshadows Dewey's position, proposing the creation of a bureau of social science 
experts to aid journalists in providing a full account of events to the public. In Public 
Opinion he tosses this view aside, arguing that at best the news media can report 
on what has become public; it has no power to "bring to light the hidden facts, to 
set them into relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men 
can act" (Lippmann, Public Opinion 226). Instead he proposes now that the experts 
should work with the officials charged with the public's business, to "represent the 
unseen" in their deliberations (Public Opinion 241). But by 1925, when he wrote The 
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Phantom Public, his pessimism had deepened. No one-not journalists, not experts, 
not officials, and certainly not ordinary citizens-could develop the breadth of 
knowledge that would render them capable of the intelligent management of pub-
lic affairs. No one was omnicompetent, not even Lippmann himself, "for, although 
public business is my main interest and I give most of my time to watching it, I can-
not find time to do what is expected of me in the theory of democracy;,that is, to 
know what is going on and to have an opinion worth expressing on every question 
which confronts a self-governing community" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 10). To 
open a reconstruction of Lippmann's view, we can start by noting that in The Phan-
tom Public he managed to work his way so deeply into pessimism as to come out the 
other side. If none of us is omnicompetent, everyone is competent; each of us has the 
capacity to mind our own business. 
The work of the world is carried on by men in their executive capacity, by an 
infinite number of concrete acts, plowing and planting and reaping, building, and 
destroying, fitting this to that, going from here to there, transforming A into B and 
moving B from X to Y. The relationships between the individuals doing these spe-
cific things are balanced by a most intricate mechanism of exchange, of contract, of 
custom, and of implied promises. Where men are performing their work they must 
learn to understand the process and the substance of these obligations if they are to 
do it at all (Lippmann, Phantom Public 41-42). 
All knowledge, in short, is local knowledge. Everyone is an insider-in some 
matters. Everyone is an expert, credentialed or not-about the activities that have 
engaged his or her interests. Beyond that, as an outsider to other transactions, he or 
she is "necessarily ignorant, usually irrelevant and often meddlesome: (Lippmann, 
Phantom Public140). 
But if there is no one who is omnicompetent-if there is no solution to the epis-
temic problems created by a Great Society-what is left of democracy? Why publics 
at all? Lippmann points out that while insiders to a transaction know enough to get 
along, the insiders do not always agree; as in the extended example he had given 
in Public Opinion, workers and capitalists at a steel mill do not always agree about 
appropriate wages (Public Opinion 253-54). Sometimes these conflicts can be man-
aged by recourse to government officials: adjudications in courts; rule making in 
executive agencies; or even the back-room dealings of ordinary politics (Lippmann, 
Phantom Public 62-63). But sometimes the conflict spills over these established 
means. At this point the insiders have only two choices. They can resort to force or 
they can appeal to outsiders to intervene. It is these conspicuous, irresolvable dis-
agreements among insiders--Lippmann calls them "crises" (for example, in Phan-
tom Public 54. 56)-that bring a public into being. 
It is worth pausing to contrast Lippmann's account of the birth of publics with 
that of Dewey. For Dewey, a public emerges when the consequences of some local 
activity are perceived by outsiders, understood, and recognized as ill. For Lippmann, 
a public emerges when a local dispute is perceived by outsiders, understood, and 
150 Jean Goodwill 
recognized as disturbing the peace. Although our authors do not use this terminol-
ogy consistently, we might say that a Deweyan public confronts problems, while a 
Lippmannian public faces issues.3 To diagnose a problem correctly requires special-
ized knowledge about the way that aspect of the world works. But to notice that 
people are fighting about something or other requires only a commonsense under-
standing of ordinary social relations. To return to the previous example, while it 
is hard to say exactly how big the buffer zone between genetically modified and 
organic corn ought to be, it is easy to notice that a lot of people have a lot of diverg-
ing views on this issue and are arguing with each other vigorously. To understand 
the appropriate buffer zone might require a doctorate in agronomy or long experi-
ence in farming-although we notice that even the PhDs and farmers are disputing; 
to notice diverging views might require a "degree" achieved on the kindergarten 
playground. 
It is not surprising that outsiders called in to defuse an issue are unable to fig-
ure out the right course of action, since the insiders themselves cannot agree. In 
Lippmann's view, the issues that the public must judge are precisely "the hardest 
controversies to disentangle .... Where the facts are most obscure, where precedents 
are lacking, where novelty and confusion pervade everything, the public in all its 
unfitness is compelled to make its most important decisions. The hardest prob-
lems are those which institutions cannot handle. They are the public's problems" 
(Lippmann, Phantom Public 121). 
In such disputes, the outsiders, mere "spectators of the action, cannot success-
fully intervene in a controversy on the merits of the case. They must judge exter-
nally." They have access only to "the overt, external forms of behavior" (Lippmann, 
Phantom Public 134) being exhibited by the parties in the dispute. Their only job "is 
to locate by clear and coarse objective tests the actor in a controversy who is most 
worthy of public support" (120 ). They conclude the debate not by deciding the issue 
but by deciding only which insider they would throw their weight behind, should 
the dispute come to blows. When a majority is mobilized and aligns itself with one 
side of the dispute, the insiders directly concerned are by the threat of the majority's 
force "driven to make terms" (64) and compose their controversy. The process is less 
one of deliberative decision-making than of"sublimated" (so) civil war. 
Lippmann offers us what he calls a "wholly tentative" (Lippmann, Phantom 
Public 133) list of some of the "overt, external forms of behavior:' aka "clear and 
coarse objective tests:' aka "coarse signs" (54) that the outsider member of the public 
can use to figure out which insider to back. In most of these Lippmann directs the 
outsider to examine the conspicuous communicative conduct of the insiders who 
are disputing with each other, taking that conduct as an indicator of the insiders' 
trustworthiness. Consider the following list of behaviors, or tests, or signs, arranged 
from the first arising of an issue to its final resolution. 
The willingness of some insiders to call for outside intervention in their busi-
ness demonstrates the significance of the dispute, since the insiders would risk the 
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unpredictable outcome of public interference only if they were seriously disturbed 
by the status quo. Gambling on a call for intervention thus suggests that the dispute 
is indeed worth the outsider's attention. As Lippmann says, "their argument may 
be wrong, the remedy may be foolish, but the fact that they openly criticize at some 
personal risk is a sign that the [established] rule [for the transaction] is not working 
well" (Phantom Public 113). 
Once the public has been called in, another "test" it "can apply ... is to note 
which party to the dispute is least willing to submit its whole claim to inquiry and 
to abide by the result" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 122). (Note that "inquiry" here 
does not mean a joint, experimental investigation; it means an "ordeal" [Phantom 
Public 122], a trial of strength held before a tribunal of some sort.) The failure to 
accept full public exposure of his or her reasoning suggests that the insider may be 
putting forward reasons less to identify some mutual accommodation of the dispute 
and more to achieve some purely individual goal-what Lippmann terms the insid-
er's "own unaccountable will" (Phantom Public 59) or "arbitrary desires" (Phantom 
Public 134). For instance, in the dispute at the steel mill mentioned above, if the 
capitalist claims "for reasons that he refuses to state" that higher wages for workers 
would bankrupt him (Lippmann, Public Opinion 254), then the outsider can take 
his refusal to proffer evidence as a sign that he has no publicly admissible reasons to 
offer. By contrast, conspicuous readiness to endure "the test of public inquiry is the 
surest clue to the sincerity of the claimant, to his confidence in his ability to stand 
the ordeal of examination, to his willingness to accept risks for the sake of his faith 
in the possibility of rational human adjustments" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 122). 
Once the debate has started, the outsider "will not be able, we may assume, to 
judge the merits of the arguments." Still, observing the interaction may prove use-
ful. "The advocates are very likely to expose one another. Open debate may lead to 
no conclusion and throw no light whatever on the problem or its answer, but it will 
tend to betray the partisan and the advocate" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 104). 
The outsider may occasionally be able to "judge who has won the dialectical vic-
tory" (Lippmann, Public Opinion 143) in the debate. For example, the outsider can 
observe when one side failed to respond to another's argument at all and can then 
declare that argument won, even without understanding it. In general the conspicu-
ous fact that the winner was able to muster more arguments on a particular occa-
sion is a coarse sign that his or her position is indeed more reasonable. (Lippmann 
hastens to add that "we are virtually defenseless against a false premise that none of 
the debaters has challenged, or a neglected aspect that none of them has brought 
into the argument.") 
Finally, the outsider may make a "cumulative judgment" about the apparent 
consequences of past decisions by the insiders (Lippmann, Phantom Publicu9). "To 
support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to 
be going badly, this ... is the essence of popular government;' Lippmann explains 
(u6). Here Lippmann foreshadows Dewey's emphasis on consequences. But instead 
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of deliberating together about the future consequences of a decision to be made, the 
outsider is invited to adjudicate a forensic controversy over the past consequences of 
one already taken. 
All but the last of these coarse signs direct outsiders to "select a few samples of 
behavior"4 (Lippmann, Phantom Public 133)-in specific to perceive, understand 
and judge how the insiders are communicating in the controversy about some affak 
Lippmann is thus the equal of Dewey in putting communication at the center of 
democratic life, although communication of a very different sort. Lippmann's 
desired talk is not cooperative but conflict-ridden. It is ainled not to reach a decision 
that everyone can agree is right but to declare a winner. It takes place not among 
open-minded inquirers but between advocates set in preexisting positions. In addi-
tion it does not allow active participation by all but is presented before spectators 
whose only job is to judge the performance. Lippmann, in short, is advising us to 
debate. 
LIPPMANN'S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON 
COMMUNICATION PEDAGOGY AND THEORY 
Debate, of course, raises interesting challenges for communication theory and peda" 
gogy. Some have even claimed that it "fail[s] to embody democratic ideas" (Keith 
96). Despite its enormous success as an extracurricular activity for undergradu-
ates, debate remains somewhat of a curricular stepchild. At least that is what is sug-
gested by the apologies that argumentation textbooks seem required to make in 
their opening chapters (reviewed in Goodwin, "Theoretical Pieties"), minimizing 
the adversarial aspects of the activity they are about to teach and generally trying 
to reframe it in a more cooperative, Deweyan mode. Lippmann is unapologetic. He 
offers us a democratic rationale for the dignity of debate. 
Recognizing the dignity of debate gives us permission to acknowledge that most 
of us, most of the time, are only spectators of others' arguments. This insight can-
not be prominent within a Deweyan frame, with its emphasis on the active col-
laboration of all citizens in the construction of social knowledge. But it provides a 
motivation for our long-standing curricular emphasis on the skills of the citizen-
spectator. Although Lippmann's Public Opinion does not live up to its reputation 
as the groundbreaking work on the art of propaganda, it was a central text in the 
development of propaganda analysis (Sproule), an approach to critical-thinking 
instruction native to the communication fields. Even Lippmann's pessinlism about 
citizens' small abilities to deal with the Great Society can play an important role in 
justifying our critical-thinking pedagogy. As he comments: 
It is often very illuminating ... to ask yourself how you got at the facts on which 
you base your opinion. Who actually saw, heard, felt, counted, named the thing, 
about which you have an opinion? Was it the man who told you, or the man who 
told him, or someone still further removed? And how much was he permitted to 
Wolter Lippmann, the Indispensable Opposition 153 
see? When he informs you that France thinks this and that, what part of France 
did he watch? How was he able to watch it? \Vhere was he when he watched it? 
What Frenchmen was he permitted to talk to, what newspapers did he read, 
and where did they learn what they say? You can ask yourself these questions, 
but you can rarely answer them. They will remind you, however, of the distance 
which often separates your public opinion from the event with which it deals. 
And the reminder is itself a protection. (Lippmann, Public Opinion 29) 
Critical thinking is not only warranted on the somewhat cynical assumption that 
everyone else is out to fool us; accepting our own vulnerability to being fooled, and 
even to fooling ourselves, can also be a ground for a moderate skepticism. 
Lippmann's defense of the dignity of debate also directs us to a central challenge 
for theory: how critical thinking can proceed at all in the face of deep asymmetries 
in knowledge. Lippmann's response to this question is paralleled in several respects 
by recent work in the "Studies of Expertise & Experience" ("SEE"-for example, 
Collins and Evans). Like Lippmann, "SEE" does not limit expertise to those with 
official credentials. Rather, anyone with long experience in a given practice is quali-
fied to speak as an expert. Still, those of us who lack relevant experience in some 
practice remain in a difficult position. When a purported expert harangues us, we 
cannot tell whether he or she is spouting pretentious nonsense or is offering impor-
tant insights beyond our ken. What can we do? Like Lippmann, "SEE" proposes 
that outsiders proceed by "making social judgments about who ought to be agreed 
with, not scientific"-or more generally, epistemic-"judgments about what ought 
to be believed" (Collins and Evans 47). The expertise required to make such social 
judgments is ubiquitous, arising from our long experience in making "judgments 
about friends, acquaintances, neighbors, relations, politicians, salespersons, and 
strangers" (Collins and Evans 45). As Lippmann comments, "we do well enough 
with doctors, though we are ignorant of medicine; ... why not, then, with a Sena-
tor, though we cannot pass an examination on the merits of an agricultural bill?" 
(Lippmann, Phantom Public 150). But only recently have "SEE" scholars begun to 
examine exactly how t!Iese social judgments are to be made (for example, Col-
lins and Weinel). Communication instructors have inherited a standard doctrine 
for assessing expertise, generally expressed as a protocol for analyzing appeals to 
expert authority. We would do well to heed the calls from Lippmann and "SEE" and 
reexamine the t!Ieory behind our pedagogy (Goodwin, "Force"): under what condi-
tions is an outsider indeed justified in trusting what an insider says? 
Where Dewey sets out his ideals in ringing phrases but necessarily leaves the 
details to be worked out in the future, through the experimental process of social 
inquiry into democratic institutions (MacGilvray), Lippmann in the second half of 
The Phantom Public reads more like a how-to manual for citizens called in to observe 
and adjudicate controversies. The coarse signs and objective tests he identifies are 
largely constituted through the communication activities of the disputing insiders. 
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So Lippmann's work invites us, finally, to shift our attention from outsiders back to 
insiders and ask what debaters can do to put spectators in a better position to judge 
their performances. For example, to get a Lippmannian debate off the ground, the 
first step must be to create the "crisis" that creates a public-in other words, to make 
an issue of some affair. Exactly how do issues get made? Noortje Marres, drawing 
in part from Lippmann, has recently called for expanded attention to the specific 
rhetorical "affordances" that "facilitate a distinctive articulation of issues, as mat-
ters of public concern"; this is a question that theorists should pursue (Marres; see 
also Goodwin, "Designing Issues"; Craig and Tracy). Or again, Lippmannian debat-
ers need to demonstrate their willingness to undergo the "ordeal" of debate. What 
strategies can debaters use to conspicuously undertake an obligation to defend their 
claims (Kauffeld, "Presumptions"; Kauffeld, "Probative Obligations")? How can 
debaters make clear to spectators when they have won a "dialectical victory"? What 
can they do to demonstrate the partisanship of the other side? And so on. Lippmann 
depends on outsiders to make a vital judgment. Even if it is not an epistemic judg-
ment of the merits, it is still one that communication can support or impede, and 
communication theorists are called to explain how. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This sketch of Lippmann's theories has shown him indeed to be Dewey's adversary 
in his conception of communication. But it also has shown him to be no adversary 
of democracy and neither an elitist nor an advocate of technocracy. Dewey, always 
a good reader of Lippmann, pointed out that Lippmann's theories could support 
radically democratic conclusions. "To avoid misconception," Dewey explains, "Mr. 
Lippmann means by 'insiders' something more than political insiders; more than 
governmental administrators and more than managers of machines:' Considering 
both workers and capitalists as insiders to the enterprise of running a steel mill, for 
example, might suggest a "decentralization in governmental affairs:' something like 
a "guild" or even a "soviet" form of organization (Dewey, "Practical Democracy" 
53--54). 
In some sense we do not need to decide between these competing conceptions 
of democratic communication. As Patricia Roberts-Miller has argued, we have 
always maintained diverse pedagogical traditions, each focusing on a particular set 
of problems and practices and each grounded in its own democratic theory; there is 
no single, "perfect model" (223). If society is great, then communication can be great 
too, I suppose, with room for a variety oflocal ways. 
Still, as good pragmatists, both Dewey and Lippmann would know that get-
ting theory straight matters. Critique of democracy is too important to leave to 
the foes of democracy; as Graham Wallas said, "if democracy is to succeed [its dif-
ficulties] must be frankly considered by the democrats themselves" (Wallas, Human 
Nature 253). Theory is lived out in practice. A true ideal will "express the true pos-
sibilities" of democracy to the citizens trying to measure up to it, Lippmann says; a 
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"false ideal" being impossible, will mislead them, and the "failure to achieve it" will 
eventually produce "disenchantment" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 29 ). It remains 
easy to prefer "Dewey's hopeful offerings of communication, community, and com-
munion to Lippmann's austere menu of method, asceticism, and skeptical realism" 
(Jansen, "Phantom Conflict" 236). So I will close with two reasons for thinking that 
the non phantom Lippmann I have sketched here remains at least a live _alternative 
to Dewey-that he continues to provide the indispensable opposition. 
Parts of The Phantom Public can be read as backing democracy only as a rela-
tively efficient method for keeping the peace, convenient because it manages dis-
agreements without resorting to violence. It is this Lippmann that Dewey may be 
gesturing at in his initial review of theories of the state: "just one of many social 
institutions, having a narrow but important function, that of arbiter in the conflict 
of other social units" (Dewey, Public and Problems 4). "The principle that all con-
troversies are soluble by peaceable agreement" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 124), 
however, is indeed a principle and one worthy of respect. Lippmann's debates may 
not produce reasoned decisions. But they remain spectacles of reason, expressing 
the public's "demand" for the "method and spirit of reason, ... even if the mate-
rial for a reasoned conclusion is lacking" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 124). Perhaps 
the "ordeal" of debate will do no more than force the disputing insiders to pro-
duce rationalizations for the positions they hold on other, less publicly admissible 
grounds. If so, the obligation to rationalize may at least prod the insiders to think 
a bit about what positions they are willing to risk defending. Further, in putting 
forward a specific rationalization, the insider will often make explicit the future that 
his or her preferred outcome is predicted to achieve. The outsiders can use this com-
mitment to measure whether things are going the way they are supposed to. If the 
consequences turn out conspicuously otherwise, they can, as Lippmann says, vote 
the other guys in. Rationalizations, in other words, lay the groundwork for account-
ability. Finally, "by insisting in all disputes upon the spirit of reason, we shall tend in , 
the long run to confirm the habit of reason" and perhaps even "extend the frontiers 
of reason" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 124-25). This may be "a pruned and temper-
ate democratic theory:' as Dewey remarked, but it is still "a reasonable conception 
of democracy" that "can be made to work, not absolutely, but at least better than 
democracy works under an exaggerated and undisciplined notion of the public and 
its powers" (Dewey, "Practical Democracy" 52). 
One of the embarrassments Dewey occasions for his friends is his unabashedly 
organic view of society (for example, Bohman). Although he occasionally mentions 
the existence of diverse views, it is not by mistake that he tends to speak of the Pub-
lic, recognizing its interest in the process making an inquiry into the consequences 
of some choice. By contrast, Lippmann not only recognizes the existence of diver-
sity and disagreement among the "random publics" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 67) 
that inhabit his democracy but also makes it the basis of his theory of democratic 
communication. "Men do not agree as to their aims, and it is precisely the lack of 
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agreement which creates the problems that excite public attention" (Phantom Public 
56). In playing out their disagreements in public, insiders create for their fellow citi-
zens the coarse signs they need to render sound social judgments. Continuing to lis-
ten to Lippmann's indispensable opposition to Dewey may thus help us cherish even 
our most heated, contentious, partisan, and divisive civic discourse, understanding 
its "true possibilities" in making public issues, rendering reasonableness apparent, 
and allowing public opinion to become a manifest force in our Great Society. 
NOTES 
1. For aesthetic reasons I will refrain from inserting sic next to every one of Lippmann's 
frequent references to citizens as exclusively male. 
2. It is Dewey, not Lippmann, who is skirting close to advocating propaganda here "by 
suggesting that artists use their skills to evoke emotions and rally the public to action" 
(Westhoff 43). 
3· In an otherwise insightful article, Marres argues that Lippmann and Dewey share a 
focus on issues. Although the pair use the terminology of"issues" and "problems" some-
what indiscriminately, their conceptions of what calls a public into being are different in 
ways her argument elides. 
4· It should be noted that Lippmann also proposes a third set of coarse signs. Outsiders 
can make an "external" examination of the insiders' specific policy proposals to see how 
they are designed. For example, Lippmann advises that a policy is to be preferred if it is so 
"organized that experience will clearly reveal its defects" (Lippmann, Phantom Public 125). 
On the face of it, this foreshadows Dewey's later conception of policy as an experiment. But 
again, Lippmann's rationale is different. Instead of relying on the policy experiments to 
produce social knowledge, Lippmann reasons that a self-testing, self-modifying policy will 
provide a settlement of the controversy that is more likely to endure. 
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